1996). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Approximately half the districts public school enrollment was black; about half was white. That case involves the original Seattle Plan, a more heavily race-conscious predecessor of the very plan now before us. This leads it to advance propositions that, in my view, are both erroneous and in fundamental conflict with basic equal protection principles. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The dissent makes much of the supposed difficulty of determining whether prior segregation was de jure or de facto. The concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High Schools special Biotechnology Career Academy. The fact that it is possible that children of group members will not be denied admission to a school based on their racebecause they choose an undersubscribed school or an oversubscribed school in which their race is an advantagedoes not eliminate the injury claimed. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992). But if the plan was lawful when it was first adopted and if it was lawful the day before the District Court dissolved its order, how can the plurality now suggest that it became unlawful the following day? The dissent emphasizes local control, see post, at 4849, the unique history of school desegregation, see post, at 2, and the fact that these plans make less use of race than prior plans, see post, at 57, but these factors seem more rhetorical than integral to the analytical structure of the opinion. Rev. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Black Womens Lawyers Association of Greater Chicago, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 16. See also Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289291 (opinion of Powell, J.) 05908, at 3942; Research, Evaluation and Assessment, Student Information Services Office, Seattle Public Schools Data Profile: DistrictSummary December 2005, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/ The State Supreme Court wrote: Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Id., at 42, 678 A. Public Schools, 330 F.Supp. Roberts cites to: "Id., at 330, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. Experience in Seattle and Louisville is consistent with experience elsewhere. Instead, it selectively relies on inapplicable precedent and even dicta while dismissing contrary holdings, alters and misapplies our well-established legal framework for assessing equal protection challenges to express racial classifications, and greatly exaggerates the consequences of todays decision. While it acknowledges that racial classifications are used to make certain assignment decisions, it fails to make clear, for example, who makes the decisions; what if any oversight is employed; the precise circumstances in which an assignment decision will or will not be made on the basis of race; or how it is determined which of two similarly situated children will be subjected to a given race-based decision. That is what is at issue here. Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise from racial balancing. Was it de facto? PICS disagrees that the race tiebreaker was necessary to the Districts goals, even if the Court finds them to be compelling interests. Beyond those minimum requirements, the Court left much of the determination of how to achieve integration to the judgment of local communities. And the fact that the state and local governments had relied on statements in this Courts opinions was irrelevant to the Brown Court. 05915, pp. Dawkins & Braddock 403. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. The Courts decision in Croson, supra, reinforced the difference between the remedies available to redress de facto and de jure discrimination: To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for remedial relief for every disadvantaged group. What about historically black colleges, which have established traditions and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another? But see ante, at 29. See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. Justice Anthony Kennedy did not join the rest of the opinion by the Chief Justice, therefore, those parts of the opinion did not command a majority. App. At Ballard, in 20052006when no class at the school was subject to the racial tiebreakerthe student body was 14.2 percent Asian-American, 9 percent African-American, 11.7 percent Latino, 62.3 percent Caucasian, and 2.8 percent Native-American. Ante, at 6; ante, at 1516 (opinion of the Court). '", Part III B (joined only by a plurality of the Court) rejected the notion that racial balancing could be a compelling state interest, as to do so "would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), relied on by the Court in Gratz, Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion, stated that preferring members of one group for no reasons other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake, and therefore unlawful. The memorandum of agreement between Seattle and OCR, of course, contains no admission by Seattle that such segregation ever existed or was ongoing at the time of the agreement, and simply reflects a desire to avoid the incovenience [sic] and expense of a formal OCR investigation, which OCR was obligated under law to initiate upon the filing of such a complaint. These plans are unconstitutional. That seemingly odd turnaround is merely a result of the fact that the remediation of de jure segregation is a jealously guarded exception to the Equal Protection Clauses general rule against government race-based decisionmaking. Regardless of its name, however, the interest at stake possesses three essential elements. Supra, at 1920. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, the Court held that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because the classification and separation themselves denoted inferiority. 05908, at 283a. ), I shall adopt the first alternative. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192. No. Brief for Respondent at 1617. See 539 U. S., at 320. 6704 (WD Wash., 1969), pp. The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. The pluralitys position, I fear, would break that promise. 05908, p.227a; Reply Brief in No. By the dissents account, improvements in racial attitudes depend upon the increased contact between black and white students thought to occur in more racially balanced schools. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 72 P.3d 151 (2003); 137 F.Supp. 2, pp. The plan paired (or triaded) imbalanced black schools with imbalanced white schools. At some point, the discrete injury will be remedied, and the school district will be declared unitary. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected Merediths challenge and held the unmodified aspects of the plan constitutional. Id., at 464. That principle has been accepted by every branch of government and is rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself. 1. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain social science research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists. Narrow tailoring requires serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives, Grutter, supra, at 339, and yet in Seattle several alternative assignment plansmany of which would not have used express racial classificationswere rejected with little or no consideration. The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm. Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that [n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the students race exceeds that percentage in the students resident district. Ark. in No. The District contends that these requirements are not met in this case. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The statement was not a technical holding in the case. See id., at 1032 (discussing other successful black schools); Walker, Can Institutions Care? At the other extreme, Santa Clara, California had a relatively even racial distribution prior to its 1979 desegregation plan. 1 Complaint in Adams v. Forbes Bottomly, Civ. Id., at 25. This argument is unavailing. 2d 834, 837845, 855862 (WD Ky. 2004). It is even more difficult to accept the pluralitys contrary view, namely that the underlying plan was unconstitutional. Post, at 22. Given the conditions in which school boards work to set policy, see supra, at 2021, they may need all of the means presently at their disposal to combat those problems. Both parents appealed the Districts placement but were unable to have their children reassigned. See, e.g., Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregations Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students, in Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education 597, 606607 (J. In such cases, race-based remedial measures are sometimes required. in No. in No. See ante, at 12, 23. See, e.g., North Carolina Bd. How does the Jefferson County School Board define diversity? A. In this Courts paradigmatic segregation cases, there was a local ordinance, state statute, or state constitutional provision requiring racial separation. ([A]ll governmental action based on racea group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited, Hirabayashi [v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)]should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed (first emphasis in original); Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 636 ([O]ur Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); Bakke, supra, at 289 (opinion of Powell, J.) of Cal. (If petitioners purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected as facially invalid). Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. In design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. See, e.g., Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 15, 35 (J. Powell, G. Kearney, & V. Kay eds. 67759, p.11 (It is implicit in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, that color or race is a constitutionally impermissible standard for the assignment of school children to public schools. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Another amicus surveys several social science studies and concludes that a fair and comprehensive analysis of the research shows that there is no clear and consistent evidence of [educational] benefits. Brief for David J. Armor etal. These changes conformed with the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy. Which of the following statements offers the most accurate comparison between this case and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954)? See, e.g., D. Armor, Forced Justice (1995). Id. Ante, at 1718. 05915, p. 97. Seattle undertook its integration efforts in response to the filing of a federal lawsuit and as a result of its settlement of a segregation complaint filed with the federal OCR.